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Introduction 
TNegotiations for CAI commenced in 2014 and have 
been protracted. As other articles in this collection 
suggest, given China’s experience with bilateral trade 
agreements (BITs) in recent years, with BITs referring to 
international arbitration rules,1 in principle an agreement 
between the EU and China should be feasible. Yet, as this 
article presents, the recent politicisation of trade policies 
in Europe, as well as defensive positions by the parties 
could scupper a deal. The major risks are centred around 
trade defensiveness (linked to market economy status), 
European concerns over increased Chinese investment in 
technological firms, and public opinion and civil society 
groups rejecting investment and trade agreements as 
manifestations of a form of globalisation they oppose.
Market Economy Status 
When China joined the WTO, it was expected that fifteen 
years after entry (in 2016) China would be granted market 
economy status. However, the EU and USA decided in late 
2016 that domestic practices still did not warrant market 
economy status. China is keen for that recognition, as it 
would stop these states from using ‘surrogate countries’ 
to determine what costs should really be, when conducting 
anti-dumping investigations against China. 
In February 2017, at a meeting on the side lines of the G20 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Bonn, the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi urged his German counterpart to resolve 
this matter to ensure the success of the Investment Agree-
ment.2  The importance of this matter cannot be underes-
timated. China has typically used free trade agreements 
(FTAs) to gain market economy status from partners (e.g. 
FTAs with Australia and New Zealand), and it is clear that 
they this will be a sine qua non condition. 
At the same time, the EU reviewed its position in the run-up 
to the WTO deadline and, alongside the USA, declined to 
interpret the WTO Protocol as an automatic recognition of 
market economy status. It has been argued that over-
production in the steel sector leading to EU anti-dumping 
measures on Chinese steel in 2016, encouraged Germany 
to not push for EU granting of market economy status.3 
It is highly unlikely that in a matter of months the situa-
tion would be so different as to warrant a reversal of the 
decision.
Impact of Trump’s policies on the EU and China
Member State Concerns over Access to Investments
Moreover, positions within the EU with regards to the 
investment agreement may be hardening. In February 
2017, the Economy Ministers of France and Germany and 
the Industry Ministry of Italy, relayed their concerns re-
garding foreign investment to the European Commission. 
They argued that whilst EU law gives member states the 
right to prohibit foreign investments that threaten public 
security and public order, an additional protection based 
on economic criteria was needed, as well as some way 
of subjecting the right of non-EU investors in the bloc to 
reciprocity. France’s newly-elected President, Emmanuel 
Macron has proposed the EU explore measures to achieve 
this, although he faces opposition from Dutch and Nordic 
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governments, who fear retaliation against such measures.4 
The European Commission’s Reflection Paper on Harness-
ing Globalisation, includes this matter. Whilst it makes no 
concrete recommendations for action, it does state that 
“concerns have recently been voiced about foreign inves-
tors, notably state-owned enterprises, taking over Europe-
an companies with key technologies for strategic reasons. 
EU investors often do not enjoy the same rights to invest 
in the country from which the investment originates’ (and 
that) (t)hese concerns need careful analysis and appropri-
ate action.” 5  
France’s and Germany’s position on the matter are particu-
larly important given their leadership role within the EU, 
especially as in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, and the 
election of Emmanuel Macron, these two states are poised 
to lead the European Union.6 Germany traditionally played 
the role of China’s advocate within the EU (e.g. encourag-
ing a more understanding position towards Chinese export 
subsidies), in part due to its strong trade relationship with 
China.7 However, as of 2015, Germany has experienced a 
growing trade deficit with China. This dovetailed in time 
with the inclusion of the social democrats (SPD) in the 
coalition government of 2013 and the handing over of the 
Ministry of Finance to SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, more inclined 
to listen to the concerns of trade unions in the country.8 
   
In the last years, Chinese companies have increased 
investments in German technological companies tak-
ing advantage of low market valuations. German public 
concerns regarding the takeover of technology have been 
growing, and were revived in May 2016 when the Chinese 
investment fund Midea communicated its plan to acquire 
the Kuka company, one of Germany’s leading producers 
of robots. The Ministry of Finance attempted to block the 
acquisition, and encourage a domestic firm to purchase 
Kuka, given concerns not just over the loss of technology 
but also of the operation granting Chinese competitors 
access to the information of other German companies us-
ing some of Kuka’s robotic applications. This failed, as the 
Board of Kuka accepted Midea’s offer and other business 
sectors feared antagonising China and facing retaliations.9  
The situation shows a clear example of the contradictory 
nature of the independent interests of particular business-
es and governments’ public interest policies. 
The  German   Ministry  for  Economic  Affairs  has  pow-
ers, under German law, to  block a  purchase  of  a  25 
percent  or  larger  stake  in  companies  related to state 
security or critical infrastructure, and can withhold the 
acquisition by a non-EU investor of a company producing 
cybersecurity software. However,  it  cannot  block  any  
acquisition  of  a  company  producing advanced tech-
nology products for civilian  application. In view of these 
limitations, and the growing number of technological 
acquisitions, the German Finance Minister proposed to the 
European Commission an amendment to EU laws to en-
able EU institutions to block non-EU acquisitions of firms 
with key technology of particular importance for industrial 
development.10  
This would elevate decisions to the EU level, granting 
the EU similar powers to those of the US Committee on 
Foreign Investment, and would raise the contentious part 
06   # 2.17
of the economic relationship to Brussels. Such a move 
could hamper future investments. In the negotiations for 
a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States, 
a key Chinese aim is to have national treatment for its 
investments and recourse to ISDS (Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement) to bolster its investors’ possible defences 
from US Committee on Foreign Investment decisions.11 
It is, therefore, unlikely that China will welcome European 
moves in this direction. However, the EU is under pressure 
from both businesses wishing better access to the Chi-
nese market and simplified investment access, and publics 
and governments, increasingly suspicious of the possible 
long-term effects of Chinese investments in European 
technology.12
Public Opinion and Trade and Investment Agreements
The importance of public opinion cannot be underesti-
mated, especially at a time when elections in the EU are 
showing signs of a weakening of traditional established 
parties in favour of newer parties, some with more nation-
alist and protectionist stances. Moreover, public opinion, 
and mobilisation led by large civil society organisations, 
encouraged a shift in the EU-United States Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, and 
the European Commission’s proposal for an investment 
court system (ICS) to replace the existing investor-state 
dispute regime of ad hoc tribunals.  It is significant that in 
the case of TTIP, it was only when TTIP was on the horizon 
that civil society mobilised against ISDS and regulatory 
convergence. When the European Commission was granted 
investment powers in the Lisbon Treaty, no such opposition 
arose. Moreover, the focus on CETA (FTA with Canada) and 
the inclusion of ISDS became a focus of popular dissatisfac-
tion only when the prospect of TTIP had raised the salience 
of these otherwise technical and technocratic matters. 
The politicisation around TTIP and ISDS, led the Wallonian 
Parliament to initially vote against granting the Belgian 
government authority to sign CETA in October 2016. After 
assurances were made to the Parliament, including the 
drafting of a Joint Interpretative Declaration that accompa-
nies CETA and reiterates governments’ right to regulate and 
to change laws even if they affect investors, it agreed in a 
subsequent vote to allow the signature.13  The inclusion of 
investor-state dispute settlement arrangements in the CAI, 
will trigger the same reaction amongst civil society groups 
and left-wing political groups, especially with regards to an 
investor already considered very powerful. 
Although the investment negotiations with China have, thus 
far, failed to attract the salience of TTIP, it is important to 
note that according to Pew’s surveys positive perceptions of 
China have been declining in key European states. Accord-
ing to the 2016 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, favourable rat-
ings of China fell in six out of eleven EU states (declining by 
17 percent in France, by 13 percent in Spain, eight percent 
in Italy, eight percent in the UK and six percent in Germany). 
This decline left only 28 percent of respondents reporting 
favourable views of China versus 6o percent with negative 
views in Germany, 28 to 56 in Spain, 32 to 61 in Italy, 32 to 
61 in France, 27 to 59 in Sweden, 37 to 44 in the UK, 37 to 42 
in Poland, 44 to 45 in Hungary, 37 to 57 in Greece.14 A 2014 
survey conducted by the Chinese telecommunications firm 
Huawei reported that 59 percent of German respondents 
viewed China’s political power as a threat.15  
Such views have been partly fuelled by high-profile dispute 
cases (e.g. solar panel dispute of 2013), and the lasting im-
pact of the financial crisis in Europe, which has dovetailed 
with increased Chinese investment and presence in Europe 
and elicited European fears.16  Research into European 
public opinion on the US and China, made the fascinating 
discovery that negative views of both US and Chinese 
influence and leadership on the global stage were highly 
correlated and linked to opposition to globalisation.17  
Anti-globalisation sentiment has been on the rise in 
Europe, especially since the financial crisis. The narrow 
victory of the Leave vote in the UK’s 2016 referendum on 
EU membership has been considered a reflection of this, 
and in the first round of the 2017 French presidential elec-
tion 40 percent of voters supported vocal anti-globalisation 
candidates (Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon).18 
Mobilisation against TTIP in Europe, conflated a number of 
issues and diverse groups, including, many involved in pre-
vious anti-globalisation movements targeting the WTO.19 
In this climate it is likely that these groups, and sectors of 
public opinion opposed to further globalisation and trade 
agreements, will also voice opposition to the signing of an 
investment agreement with China, which further engrains 
liberal economic doctrines.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the fact that in practical terms, given recent BITs 
by the parties, and the fact that China has gradually adopt-
ed international (ICSID) standards in its types of invest-
ment agreements, and agreement is plausible, the growing 
politicisation of trade matters in Europe could hamper pro-
gress. The Treaty of Lisbon was designed to enhance the 
European Commission and European Parliament’s powers 
in trade policy. Ironically, the initial impact of the Treaty has 
been contestation of those new powers by member states 
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and publics.20 Member States have queried the degree of 
investment competences transferred to the Commission 
in the Treaty, and delayed the start of the ratification of 
the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, as they awaited 
the European Court of Justice’s Opinion on the matter. 
The Court’s decision that non-direct investment (portfo-
lio investment) and measures relating to investor-state 
disputes remained areas where the European Union did 
not have exclusive competences, has opened the door to 
lengthy ratification processes as agreements including 
these matters will also have to also be ratified in each of 
the member states.21
National ratification affords dissatisfied groups an oppor-
tunity to object and stymie the agreement. At a time of 
increased polarisation of public opinion around globalisa-
tion and trade, and an unprecedented level of mobilisation 
against TTIP, such a scenario is imaginable, as exemplified 
in the EU-Canada agreement (CETA). Opposition to TTIP 
spilled over into CETA, especially over investor-state dis-
pute arbitration. Even though the European Commission 
has innovated with the ICS and language curtailing its use, 
public concerns remain. 
Moreover, given that China is viewed by some publics as a 
threat, especially amongst those holding anti-globalisation 
views, perhaps the question we should be asking is why 
broader contestation has not happened yet. If domestic 
politics are likely to affect the negotiations, so too, will the 
hardening of positions on market economy status. The 
challenges faced by both parties in the negotiations reveal 
the importance of economic objectives in negotiations and 
domestic politics, and show how, despite both China’s and 
the EU’s vocal commitment to global trade in the Trump 
era,22 the reality may be far more challenging. ©
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Introduction 
Transparency is aptly deemed as a pivotal principle 
of effective governance,1 and its different nuances 
have a noteworthy impact in both the domestic and 
the international arena. While promoters of trans-
parency urge for the broadest scope of its applica-
tion, advocating ample access to documents and 
narrowly interpreted derogations, opponents remain 
sceptical and stress, on the contrary, the risks for                                    
national security in certain sensitive cases,2 and that 
amicus curiae intervention can lead to an escalation of 
procedural costs,3 with consequent, tangible detriment to 
the investor.    
                         
In particular, as it emerges from a normative analysis 
based on the treaties already signed respectively by 
the EU and China, it is highly likely that, in the EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), currently 
under negotiations between the two actors, the partners 
will diverge regarding transparency, in both its proce-
dural and regulatory aspects. Hence, it is reasonable to 
hypothesise that this will be one of the points to which 
the highest level of attention and detail will be dedicated 
by the two delegations. The paper is structured in five 
sections: the first draws the distinction between regula-
tory and procedural transparency, explaining their value 
and the implications of a narrower or broader degree of 
application. Sections two and three analyse respectively 
the Chinese and the EU approach to procedural transpar-
ency through a normative study. Section four focuses on 
regulatory transparency, and identifies the approach to 
the legislation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as an 
area of high interest and possible collision between the 
views of China and the EU. Finally, Section five draws the 
conclusion of the research, adding a wider perspective 
which considers the particular significance of the CAI 
with respect to other International Investment Agree-
ments in the global geo-political context.
The emergence of transparency in  
international investment law    
CAlthough each sphere of the inherently fragmented 
international law has its own normative structure, courts 
and tribunals, and thus no universally accepted definition 
of transparency exists so far, the development of suita-
ble transparency regimes is vital for the achievement of 
certain important aims of international law.4  In the sector 
of international investment law, among those aims is the 
production of investment treaties and clauses related to 
the resolution of investment disputes in arbitration. In 
pursuing these aims, in the de quo field, transparency may 
refer to either regulatory transparency, or transparency in 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
In keeping with regulatory transparency, all pieces of leg-
islation, administrative regulations and orders pertaining 
to investment must be disclosed by states. Unsurprisingly 
then, “access to meaningful information is recurrently cited 
as a powerful incentive to invest”.5  Conversely, transparen-
cy in ISDS regulates public access to arbitral proceedings.  
 
The value of transparency in investment law has been 
recalled by the United Nations Commission on Internation-
al Trade Law (UNCITRAL) during negotiations for the Rules 
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion: transparency is seen as “an important step to respond 
to the increasing challenges regarding the legitimacy of 
international investment law and arbitration as such”.6 
TRANSPARENCY AND ITS ROLE IN THE EU-CHINA 
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
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Centring now the attention on transparency in ISDS, it 
is commonly agreed that its application in a number of 
dimensions of the ISDS system requires improvement, as 
discerned by the civil society and other actors in inter-
national investment.7  The UNCITRAL worked for several 
years to develop the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty Based Investor-State Arbitration:8 and it was only 
in the aftermath of their proposal that increased attention 
began to be paid to transparency also by other institu-
tions, such as the International Center for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and other institutions of 
commercial arbitration. On the other hand, some research-
ers raised doubts regarding the impact of transparency 
on investment arbitration, despite the importance that 
was given to it.9 Advocates for wider transparency in 
investor-state arbitration attribute a special significance to 
the subject, since public interest is strongest in this kind 
of proceedings: the circumstance that the arbitral panel 
can undertake a task usually reserved for national courts, 
namely, the review of state policies, shall be afforded spe-
cial attention. In effect, in contrast to commercial arbitra-
tion, investment arbitration involves a State as respondent 
party.10 If the tribunal rules that sState measures have 
violated the applicable treaty and affected the inves-
tor’s rights, the respondent faces the likelihood of being 
compelled to pay a considerable amount for damages, 
irrespective of whether its actions were meant to serve the 
public interest.
Furthermore, unlike commercial arbitration, investment 
arbitration elicits greater public interest, not only because 
its outcomes are more significant for the entire society, but 
also because the issues brought up in investment disputes 
involve to State measures. This occurs particularly when 
the challenged measures are related to public health, the 
environment, and/or direct or indirect expropriation. An 
appropriate degree of transparency in arbitral proceed-
ings and awards may contribute to improve the efficiency 
of governance, as the public is afforded insight into the 
approach adopted by their country, acting as host state, in 
relation to the performance of its public obligations.
Research has discerned several important matters in rela-
tion to transparency in ISDS:
a. Publication of the notice of arbitration;
b. Publication of the parties’ submissions;
c. Access to proceedings-related documents such as 
exhibits, expert reports, witness statements, and tran-
scripts of hearings, except for confidential or protected 
information;
d. Amicus curiae briefs;
e. Submission of the claimant’s home state in the role of 
non-disputing party;
f. Public access to hearings;
g. Publication of orders, decisions, and the award.11
Most notably, it will be the applicable treaty that will define 
the transparency regime in each case. 
China’s approach to procedural transparency  
in international investment agreements 
The first actual Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that China 
signed was with Sweden, in 1982.12 China subsequently 
entered BITs with other Western countries during the initial 
phase of its economic reform.13 As discussed in many 
studies, the conclusion of treaties exclusively with indus-
trialised countries that were, and continue to be, capital ex-
porters, was motivated by China’s desire to attract Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).14 Gradually, however, China started 
to manifest greater openness toward BITs, and no longer 
focused exclusively on FDI inflow. This change coincided 
with the implementation of the Going Out Policy in 1999.15
Regarding the BIT text, three Model BIT versions were 
developed and employed by China over time:
a. The first version of the Model BIT was used during the 
1980s;
b. The second version was used in the early part of the 
1990s;
c. The third and present version has been in use since the 
end of the 1990s.
The differences in China’s Model BIT versions reflect how 
the country evolved from a closed to a more open market 
economy embracing globalisation. In effect, in 1998 China 
changed its status, becoming not only a capital importer 
but also a capital exporter, and this transformation had a 
marked impact on how China approached International 
Investment Agreements (IIAs).
Focusing on transparency within the BITs signed by China 
over time is important to have a better grasp of the evolu-
tion of Beijing’s position on this matter. In fact, assessing 
whether China’s position has been stable or has undergone 
an evolution throughout time, may allow us to identify a 
milestone of its negotiations policy, or, vice-versa, a devel-
opment trend, which, in turn, grants the possibility to make 
reasoned hypotheses on its stance in the near future. 
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Considering the situation within the travaux préparatoires 
of the 2010 UNCITRAL Working Group, China admitted 
that no provisions on amicus curiae submissions, publi-
cation of documents, or involvement of a third party had 
been included in any of the treaties it entered up to that 
point.16 In the following years, however, China started to 
rethink its approach. In the Canada-China Foreign Invest-
ment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA), signed 
in 2012,17  the number of clauses related to investor-state 
arbitration transparency is considerably high, and what 
is more, the way in which they are phrased is not signif-
icantly different from that of the 2004 Canadian Model 
FIPA.18 Although the two versions are unquestionably 
distinct in certain respects, they share close similarities 
when it comes to the publication of the award and the 
possibility to submit amicus curiae briefs. Meanwhile, the 
respondent must consent to additional transparency-re-
lated issues, like public access to hearings, publication of 
written submissions and access to additional documents. 
The right of the host state to veto certain transparency 
rules is highlighted in the recent China-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (ChAFTA), concluded in 2015, although it has a 
positive wording: “With the agreement of the respondent, 
the tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public”.19  
Procedural transparency as a long-established  
EU priority
The formal emergence of the EU as a competent actor in 
the field of investment was enshrined in the 2009 Euro-
pean Union treaties, which gave the EU exclusive compe-
tence in the investment field;20  prior to this, instruments 
such as IIAs could be concluded, maintained, and used 
not only by the EU but also by the Member States.21  In 
May 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU delivered Opinion 
2/15, delimiting the scope of the EU exclusive competence 
on FDI: it clarified that the shared competence pertains, 
among others, to regulatory transparency and ISDS,22 and 
consequently required the Member States’ consent to 
conclude preferential trade agreements which include the 
mentioned provisions.
It is interesting to recall the emphasis on transparency 
placed by the EU also in its internal procedures: instru-
ments such as public consultations, the transparency reg-
ister, the register of funding recipients, advanced rules for 
access to documents, and agendas, calendar, minutes and 
voting results of Council meetings, prove that transparency 
is a top priority of the EU institutions. 
The same policy applies in external relations, the EU made 
procedural transparency omnipresent in its negotiations. 
In fact, it is of note that the UNCITRAL Rules on Trans-
parency in Treaty Based Investor-State Arbitration 23 are 
referred to in all IIAs either currently negotiated or finalised 
by the EU: EU-Vietnam, CETA and TTIP. The UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules are responsible for regulating a range 
of ISDS-related transparency issues, including public ac-
cess to hearings, publication of documents and the award, 
and amicus curiae briefs. The EU-Vietnam IIA and the 
CETA enforce stringent transparency provisions, since they 
comprise the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, publication 
of laws, and acceptance of third-party funding, if they are 
made known during the preliminary stage of the dispute.
Unravelling the differences between EU and China in 
terms of regulatory transparency
It derives from the above that transparency in EU-China 
negotiations concerns not only transparency in ISDS, but 
also transparency in rules emanated by both countries, 
referring to the obligation of the State to publish its laws, 
administrative regulations and orders relating to invest-
ment. Also, this field represents an area where the views of 
China and the ones of the EU may clash, considering the 
attention that the EU dedicates not only to the publication 
of its pieces of legislation, but also the long legislative 
procedures applied to approve them.  Precisely because 
of the differences in the negotiating parties’ respective ap-
proaches on regulatory transparency, the risk that the final 
agreement on the CAI will be delayed grows higher. 
In this regard, some commentators have expressed 
concern regarding the legislative framework issued by 
the Chinese government and related to Chinese investors 
and SOEs. In fact, according to some experts, the whole 
Chinese industry is marked by vigorous involvement of 
the state: in particular, SOEs can rely on the Government’s 
economic support.24
In the past, due to the tight control of the State Council, 
it was believed that China’s outward foreign direct invest-
ment was closely linked to the government’s political con-
siderations.25 This was a source of concern for EU citizens, 
at that time linked with rather political than economic con-
siderations. Nowadays, the presence and power of SOEs, 
having a great economic strength derived from substantial 
State funding, and their ability to energetically conquer the 
EU markets give rise to disquiet - in its specifically eco-
nomic angle - on behalf of EU investors.
In addition to the SOEs’ enormous economic capacity 
and their different ability to tackle enterprise risk, which 
put them in a position of strong advantage vis-a-vis EU 
companies, another important factor needs to be recalled: 
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ownership and control of SOEs are rather unclear, although 
it is known that the latter are supported by the State in 
their outbound investments, and therefore able to pay 
acquisitions with State funds. On the other hand, EU com-
petition law prohibits State Aid to EU companies,26 with 
an exception only for the agricultural sector. These EU law 
provisions, confirmed by the award of the Micula case,27 
penalise EU investors, since Chinese investors can count 
on State subsidies, but EU investors cannot do so. This 
carries the risk of distorting the market, threatening fair 
competition.28 SOEs funding may, in fact, amount to state 
aid giving them unfair advantage vis-à-vis EU investors. 
It has to be added that, due to the scarce transparency 
of Chinese laws and regulations pertaining to SOEs, EU 
investors do not have concrete elements to demonstrate 
the main significant differences of conditions to enter and 
operate the market by EU enterprises and Chinese SOEs. 
Furthermore, as reported by several scholars, in various 
cases the ownership and control of a certain company 
cannot be easily retraced.29 As a consequence, it is rather 
improbable that the differences between EU and Chinese 
companies can be fully documented and brought to light 
with the aim to persuade the EU to issue, in the interest 
of EU investors, re-balancing rules. However, on 2nd June 
2017, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, in charge of 
competition policy, announced that the Commission has 
agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding with China to 
start a dialogue on State Aid control.30  
 
Furthermore, as state support may improve the SOEs’ pur-
chasing power in international operations of merger and 
acquisition, political sensitivities might still be involved in 
host countries specifically due to the SOEs’ ties to the Chi-
nese government.31 Moreover, the governments of some 
Member States have recently expressed reservations 
regarding the participation of Chinese companies to stra-
tegic projects such as nuclear power plants construction 
and high-tech parks development in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France.32 These sectors are considered as 
important strategic assets of the various countries, and 
the scarce transparency of Chinese legislation on SOEs, 
in particular, regarding the ownership and control of these 
companies, has given rise to concerns based on security 
grounds. As a consequence, due to the differences in 
the transparency of laws in China and in the EU, the CAI 
negotiations may turn out to be quite complex, due to the 
economic and political implications linked to the lack of 
transparency of SOEs regulation in China. Hence, a final 
agreement could take longer to reach.
A further point has been raised by EU lawyers, who are 
concerned about the extent to which FDI in the EU is 
channelled through entities based in tax havens such as 
Hong Kong, eroding the margin for tax collection.33 Conse-
quently, strong diplomatic skills will be required from both 
prospective partners to successfully deal with this issue of 
regulatory transparency.
Transparency projections for the rising star  
of investment treaties
Based on the normative analysis hereby conducted, there 
is a high probability that some degree of transparency, 
both in its procedural and regulatory aspects, will be 
requested by the EU in its negotiations with China, given 
the significant emphasis placed on improving transparen-
cy and the inclination towards this issue reflected in the 
IIAs that the EU has recently concluded, and those being 
currently negotiated.
Transparency is an essential issue on the agenda in the 
CAI negotiations, as it is concerned not only with publica-
tion of laws and regulations, but also within ISDS. China’s 
more flexible attitude towards enhanced transparency, as 
reflected in its latest investment agreements referring to 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investor-State Ar-
bitration, means that the EU will likely succeed in demand-
ing some level of transparency. Unquestionably, the way 
arbitration proceedings will be conducted and the extent 
to which this tool of dispute resolution will be deemed as 
legitimate will depend on the phrasing agreed during the 
negotiations.
There are several expected factors that will determine the 
degree of transparency consented to in the negotiations, 
such as the status of China and the EU as capital import-
ers and exporters, their mutual politico-economic rela-
tionships, and the relationships forged with other leading 
powers. 
Finally, it is worth to glance at the broader scenario: due to 
the relevance the EU-China CAI will have in the internation-
al arena, other countries will probably seek to emulate the 
transparency level established therein, imitating it in their 
own international investment agreements,34 and therefore 
‘standardising’ the phrasing of the transparency provisions 
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Introduction 
Perhaps, the main challenge in the EU-China CAI negoti-
ations relates to the regulation and treatment of Chinese 
SOEs. In general, market access barriers on investments 
continue to exist in China at both national and local 
levels as a result, inter alia, of selective investment 
screening policies. Various sectors considered strategic 
for the Chinese economy remain closed to foreign inves-
tors. Other industries are only partially accessible. Here, 
foreign investors face numerous restrictions including 
the prohibition of incorporating wholly owned foreign 
companies, the necessity to comply with local laws and 
regulations and onerous administrative procedures. 2 
Barriers to foreign investment are often closely connect-
ed with the status and role that SOEs play in the Chinese 
economy and their linkage with Chinese state authorities 
at all levels. SOEs (and, at times, private domestic com-
panies) “enjoy an unfair competitive advantage when 
it comes to public procurement or bidding procedures, 
either because they can leverage their financial advantag-
es gained via subsidies and access to loans, or because 
foreign invested companies are simply excluded.” 3 Finally, 
SOEs often integrate administrative and business func-
tions and, consequently, they assume a regulatory role in 
the relevant industry. 4 
Thus, from a European perspective, the EU should prioritise 
the negotiation of clear provisions and effective enforce-
ment mechanisms to limit the plethora of policies, laws 
and regulations favouring SOEs.
This article discusses the issue of investment arbitration 
within the context of the EU-China Bilateral Comprehen-
sive Agreement on Investment (CAI) and its implications 
for the effective protection of the rights of EU investors. 
However, the chosen perspective partly differs from 
previous studies in this area. The analysis will primarily 
focus on the role and status of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) within the context of China’s system 
of governance and economic model to explain the Chi-
nese government’s ambivalent and cautious approach to 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs). First, the analysis shall 
focus on the status of Chinese SOEs to understand their 
role in China’s gradual liberalisation of ISDS mechanisms 
in BITs. Second, the study shall discuss the implications 
of China’s system of governance and economic model for 
investment arbitration. Finally, the article shall consider 
the challenges emerging from the investment activities of 
Chinese SOEs in the EU and from the potential application 
of ISDS mechanisms towards them within the context of 
the EU-China CAI.
China’s liberalisation of ISDS mechanisms in BITs:  
the role of SOEs
Over the years, the Chinese government has been imple-
menting a number of ad hoc policies to support domes-
tic companies and, in particular, SOEs with the aim of 
establishing national champions capable of competing at 
international level. For instance, following the well-known 
Going Out policy, Chinese companies have been receiving 
substantial financial support by state authorities and, 
in various occasions, they have been shielded from the 
THE EU-CHINA CAI NEGOTIATIONS AND ISDS  





competition of foreign corporations by means of specific 
legislative and regulatory instruments. 5  
However, the formulation of policies to introduce more 
competition in the stagnant SOE sector and the trend of 
reducing the control of the state over the economy have 
not proceeded at the same pace. For instance, growing 
criticism from some government circles about excessive 
privatisation and the desire to impose stricter controls 
on foreign investors has contributed to the application 
of a more relaxed approach towards the anticompetitive 
conducts of SOEs and has favoured the emergence of an 
ambivalent attitude towards openness. 
Interestingly, in recent years, the Going Out policy of the 
Chinese government has been coupled with a reform strat-
egy promoting a ‘mixed-ownership’ model for the privati-
sation of SOEs.6  Some commentators argue that this new 
approach “reflects the shift in the Chinese government’s 
BIT negotiating strategy from investment promotion to 
investment protection.”7  With reference to the specific 
issue of investment arbitration, they report a gradual liber-
alisation of ISDS mechanisms within the context of China’s 
BITs and they link this phenomenon to the intention of 
the Chinese government to further promote its Going Out 
strategy.8
In line with what happened with the implementation of 
many other economic and reforms since the late seven-
ties, the Chinese government opted for a gradualist and 
cautious approach to BITs, in general, and to ISDS in par-
ticular.9 It is worth remembering that the decline of China’s 
planned economy began in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping, tak-
ing over Mao’s legacy, formulated the so-called ‘Open Door’ 
policy. Yet, China opted for a gradualist reform approach 
by privileging pragmatism and experimentalism. Although, 
China’s accession to the WTO has accelerated the pace of 
economic reform, gradualism has continued to character-
ise the action of the Chinese government.10
China’s gradualist approach to investment arbitration
These considerations help shed some light on the pos-
sible development of EU-China CAI negotiations on ISDS 
mechanisms. In their classic form, BITs have primarily 
focused on post-entry provisions by offering protection to 
investments which had been allowed under the rules of the 
host state.11 
A similar approach is also the one adopted by China in the 
BITs negotiated with the EU Member States so far.12 Hence, 
it is likely that China would also accept to introduce ISDS 
covering post-entry protection in the EU-China CAI. For 
instance, Berger and Poulsen consider that: “China should 
therefore be willing to accept the approach in the recent EU 
agreement with Canada, for instance, where investment 
arbitration is limited to the post-establishment phase.”13
However, it should also be noted that the protection 
standards offered to foreign investments differ signif-
icantly in the existing BITs between China and the EU 
Member States. The most significant achievements in the 
gradual development of Chinese BITs were made by the 
2001 Netherlands-China BIT and, in particular, the 2003 
Germany-China BIT which incorporates “substantive and 
procedural provisions that meet the standard of modern 
investment treaties.”14 
For instance, it was noted that the treaty encompasses 
a far-reaching definition of investment providing that all 
essential rights and interests for engaging in business ac-
tivities (including indirect investments) fall under the scope 
of the agreement.15 Since other agreements concluded 
by Member States with China fail to introduce such high 
standards, a major goal for the EU would be to upgrade 
in the EU-China CAI “the conditions and standards for EU 
investors in China and Chinese investors in the EU through 
processes of legal definition and improved clarification of 
rights and obligations.”16
Following this line of reasoning, however, much more 
controversial would be China’s acceptance of ISDS cover-
ing pre-entry protection. Consistently with its gradualist 
approach to economic reforms and liberalisation, China 
has been first experimenting and assessing ISDS cover-
ing post-entry protection, but it does not seem to have a 
coherent and clear strategy in relation to ISDS covering 
pre-entry protection yet. Thus, China is likely to be unwill-
ing to adopt a liberal approach on the matter in the near 
future. For instance, it was noted that: “Chinese and other 
scholars have been worried by ICSID and the international 
arbitration community’s broad BIT interpretations [...].”17
In this regard, still too many uncertainties exist about the 
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full implications of open arbitration for China’s economic 
model. The Chinese government aims at maintaining 
China’s authoritarian system of governance in equipoise 
and this requires a careful and cautious planning of any 
changes in politically and socially sensitive policies includ-
ing investment policies.18
China’s system of governance and economic model: 
implications for investment arbitration
Irrespective of the types of investment arbitration pro-
cedures that China will decide to adopt in the EU-China 
CAI, the discussion on the actual effectiveness of ISDS 
mechanisms for the protection of European investors’ 
rights in the Chinese market is intrinsically linked with the 
analysis of China’s system of governance and economic 
model. One crucial factor to understand these issues is the 
analysis of the role the state over the Chinese economy 
that, although gradually diminishing, remains prominent. 
China’s socialist market economy is not intended to be an 
economy free of state regulation. The formulation of mar-
ket rules has been considered by the Chinese government 
in its own way as a new form of state intervention into the 
economy.19 Arguably, nowadays, the Chinese government 
still retain control over the economy in order to pursue tar-
geted policy goals, such as promoting strategic industries, 
creating national champions, favouring the development 
of domestic SMEs and ensuring social stability.20 Macroe-
conomic policy instruments remain effective tools of inter-
vention. In this respect, the Chinese government has been 
adjusting its role from directly planning and redistributing 
economic resources to implementing ad hoc industrial 
policies to redistribute these resources on the market.
In conclusion, it appears that China’s attitude towards 
market openness remains often instrumental to the 
achievement of the economic goals pursued by the Chi-
nese government. If such an instrumental view is predom-
inant, any provisions introduced in investment agreements 
and any types of arbitration mechanism will not enjoy an 
entirely autonomous status. Most likely, these will continue 
to be regarded as subordinate to policies and rules which 
are considered by the Chinese government as strategic at 
a particular time for the promotion of the socialist market 
economy. 
Chinese SOEs’ investment activities in the EU: ISDS 
mechanisms and the protection of European investors’ 
rights
When considering ISDS mechanisms within the context of 
EU-China CAI negotiations, the other side of the coin refers 
to the many controversies deriving from the investment 
activities of Chinese SOEs in Europe. Major concerns are 
especially related to their status and to the leading role 
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that these enterprises play in terms of Chinese outward 
FDI. European business operators and policy makers com-
plain that SOEs benefit of unfair competitive advantages 
as a result of the support of the Chinese government. In 
this respect, they have started to question the transpar-
ency and the true intentions of Chinese SOEs’ investment 
activities which have been progressively perceived “as a 
threat to fair market competition and even national secu-
rity”.21 
The constant increase of Chinese investment by SOEs 
in key sectors of Member States’ economy makes the 
approximation of rules and mechanisms regulating foreign 
investments at EU level a priority. Nicolas notes that: 
“Such an approach may help guard against the risk of a 
protectionist drift inside the EU, as well as the possibility 
that some investors may one day pose a threat to national 
security.”22
 It is worth saying that, consistently with the EU principle 
of non-discrimination, Member States’ policies and rules 
are neutral when considering the origin of foreign invest-
ment. Furthermore, the EU Member States, perhaps also 
as a consequence of the prolonged financial and economic 
crisis in Europe, have demonstrated an unexpected open-
ness towards investments originating from Chinese SOEs 
in industries which are usually considered of strategic 
importance for the national economy.23 However, while 
most EU member States have not implemented any formal 
national security review mechanisms for foreign investors, 
“some major EU countries, including Germany, have recent-
ly amended their national security review policies so as to 
make them more restrictive.”24 
On the basis of these considerations, additional concerns 
seem to emerge in relation to the implications of the 
investment activities of Chinese SOEs in Europe and the 
introduction of ISDS in the EU-China CAI. Again, the root 
cause is China’s system of governance and economic 
model, and their relationship with Chinese SOEs. 
Certainly, since the beginning of the reform in the late 
1970s, China’s system of governance has progressively 
become “more flexible, entrepreneurial, legalistic and tech-
nocratic.”25 However, far from repudiating the crucial role 
of the state into the economy, the current approach seems 
to privilege a more indirect control of China’s economic 
development by means of industrial policies, including 
investment policies. Within this context, it appears that the 
Chinese government aims to encourage SOEs to devel-
op and to expand globally for the purpose of increasing 
the international competitiveness of the whole Chinese 
economy.
By operating on the international market as de facto ‘em-
anations of the state’ in the pursuit of China’s economic 
goals, SOEs and their investment activities may generate 
imbalances and asymmetries in the application of ISDS 
not as a result of the architecture of arbitration mecha-
nisms but rather of the nature and characteristics of the 
claimants. 
In this regard, in their policy considerations for negotiating 
a US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, US analysts noted 
that: “The status of SOEs in ICSID procedures is ambigu-
ous. At issue is the question of whether an SOE is a state 
entity (therefore falling within the scope of state-to-state 
disputes) or a commercial entity (therefore falling within 
the scope of investor-state disputes).”26 The challenging 
questions, which have characterised the recent academic 
debate, on whether BITs are also available to SOEs as 
claimants when acting in a governmental capacity and, 
if not, how to distinguish commercial from governmental 
conduct by SOEs become even more intricate when con-
sidering the status of Chinese SOEs.27
Conclusion
In the EU, huge concerns already exist about the risk that, 
similarly to what happens in their domestic market, Chinese 
SOEs will tend to perpetrate unfair business practices on 
the EU market. In this regard, the potential imbalances and 
asymmetries in the application of ISDS mechanisms deriving 
from the characteristics of the Chinese claimants would likely 
generate additional tensions among European investors, who 
would see it as a constraint on their right to enjoy fair treat-
ment and effective judicial protection in the EU market.
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The European Commission emphasised that “investment 
presents itself as a new frontier for the common commer-
cial policy.”28 Thus, the development of an international in-
vestment policy at supranational level is viewed as crucial 
to enhance the EU’s competitiveness and to achieve the 
objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as 
set out in the Europe 2020 Strategy.29
Within this context, the negotiations of the EU-China CAI 
represent for the EU not only a new phase in the invest-
ment relations with China, but also a crucial test for the 
supranational approach to the CCP as designed by the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
At present, it remains to be seen whether the EU existing 
policy and legislative instruments will be successful in en-
suring legitimacy, effectiveness, respect of the rule of law, 
and compliance with fundamental rights. From this point 
of view, the EU-China CAI negotiation process has the 
potential to lead to a fortified and more integrated Europe-
an Union or to exacerbate governance and co-ordination 
problems between the EU institutions and the Member 
States. ©
